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Abstract 
Nigeria is a multi-ethnic and culturally diverse society that has witnessed conflicts arising from this ethnic and 
cultural diversity. This paper expounds such conceptual issues as ethnicity, cultural diversity, federalism and 
national integration and then presents the historical background to ethnic and cultural conflicts in Nigeria. It is 
argued that national integration in the Nigerian context has been an attempt to forge “unity in diversity”, seeking 
to wish away socio-cultural differences and imposing uniformity in spite of complex cultural diversity. This has 
created more conflict and posed obstacles to unity, peaceful co-existence, progress and stable development. It 
recommends that national integration and its benefits can be realized only with the development and 
entrenchment of a supportive public culture; understanding, respecting and tolerating differences occasioned by 
socio-cultural diversity; as well as the development of new institutions and mechanisms that address poverty, 
revenue allocation and other national issues peacefully. 
Keywords: Ethnic diversity, cultural diversity, conflict, national integration, Nigeria. 
 
1. Introduction 
Right from the 19
th
 century, sociologists have wondered how societies manage to create and maintain stability 
and social order. During that era, it was clear that traditional and rather authoritarian ways to impose order and 
deference could no longer be defended in the wake of the French and other democratic revolutions. Nevertheless, 
most sociologists would agree that social cohesion and social order could only be maintained by the presence of 
a normative consensus among the population. For most inhabitants of the nation-state, there should not be any 
discussion about the basic values of society. In most countries, the educational system was used to strengthen or 
to establish such normative consensus. Of course, during the 19
th
 century too, a number of western societies were 
faced with the arrival of new immigrant groups. This form of diversity led to some tensions at some points, but it 
did not challenge the fundamental paradigm of the need for a normative consensus among the population 
(Hooghe, 2006). Newly arriving groups were expected to integrate into the already existing social value pattern, 
and the education system was used to achieve this normative integration (Hooghe, 2006). For those groups 
which did not wish to become integrated, or which did not succeed in the integration task, only a second-class 
form of citizenship was possible. These groups were considered, either as only temporary inhabitants, or as not 
really or fully belonging to society. 
In fact, the preference for homogeneity was still present well into the 20
th
 century, and it was even 
strengthened because of the occurrence of communal violence in the 1950s and 1960s. The violence in countries 
like Bangladesh, India or Nigeria strengthened political scientists in their conviction that ethnically diverse 
societies inevitably would lead to conflicts, or that at least they would undermine a sense of national belonging 
or the loyalty toward the nation-state. It is important to keep in mind in this respect that social order, to some 
extent, is dependent on a shared identity among the members of a society. It is only if this common identity is 
present, that we can expect that a feeling of generalized trust will be present, and this form of trust can be 
considered as one of the main foundations of social order.  
The poser, therefore, is, if the feeling of national identity is being threatened by an increasing cultural 
diversity, what can a nation-state like Nigeria (which is a good example of a society in which cultural divisions 
appear especially implacable) do? The “national question” had dominated Nigerian politics since before 
independence in 1960. The vilification of ethnicity as the scapegoat of all vices associated with the Nigerian 
body polity has made the subject a dominant theme in the study of Nigerian political economy. How then has her 
leaders upheld the nation’s ideal of a “just and egalitarian society” by reducing inequalities in interpersonal 
incomes, promoting balanced development among various communities in different geographical areas of the 
country? How has Nigeria managed or how can it manage its ethnic and cultural diversity to attain national 
integration? These, amongst others, are what this article seeks to examine. 
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2. Conceptual Issues  
To begin with, ethnicity is conceptualized as “the employment or mobilization of ethnic identity and difference 
to gain advantage in situations of competition, conflict or cooperation” (Osaghae, 1995). This definition is 
preferred because it identifies two issues that are central to discussions on ethnicity. The first is that ethnicity is 
neither natural nor accidental, but is the product of a conscious effort by social actors. The second is that 
ethnicity is not only manifest in conflictive or competitive relations but also in the contexts of cooperation. A 
corollary to the second point is that ethnic conflict manifests itself in various forms, including voting, 
community service and violence. Thus, it needs not always have negative consequences. 
Ethnicity also encompasses the behaviour of ethnic groups. Ethnic groups are groups with ascribed 
membership, usually but not always based on claims or myths of common history, ancestry, language, race, 
religion, culture and territory. While all these variables need not be present before a group is so defined, the 
important thing is that such a group is classified or categorised as having a common identity that distinguishes it 
from others. It is this classification by powerful agencies such as state, religious institutions and the intelligentsia 
such as local ethnic historians that objectifies the ethnic group, often setting in motion processes of self-
identification or affirmation and recognition by others (Ukiwo, 2005). Thus, ethnicity is not so much a matter of 
“shared traits or cultural commonalities”, but the result of the interplay between external categorization and self-
identification (Brubaker et al, 2004). Most analysts agree on the basic constitutive elements of ethnic groups but 
disagree on how and why they were formed, why ethnicity occurs, why it occasionally results in violent conflicts 
and what should be done to prevent its perverse manifestations. Also, in most cases, members of ethnic minority 
groups are faced with structural forms of discrimination and exclusion. Despite all these negative trends and 
events, however, it is not the case that the increase in ethnic diversity can be considered as a fundamental 
challenge for the stability and cohesion of a society.  
Next is cultural diversity. This is the variety of human societies or cultures in a specific region, or in the 
world as a whole (Wikipedia, 2007). Culture itself is usually defined in two ways: a narrow definition, which 
focuses on cultural products and expressions, such as traditional dance, theatre, sculptures or buildings, and a 
broader definition, which views culture as “the way we live”. The latter, which is applied in this paper, is all-
inclusive of human endeavour. Within this broad definition, military action would even be culturally-embedded. 
Culture is a constructed phenomenon, created through the human endeavours to transform nature and the 
environment in order to sustain and enrich life. As human beings are social beings, culture becomes established 
through particular ways of living. Culture is transferred through human interaction, from trans-generational ones 
(e.g. through family and ethnic group) to inter-group ones (cultural interaction). In this transferal process, culture 
is often adapted to new circumstances or restructured, e.g. to address new beliefs, opportunities, a crisis or a 
threat. As a construct, culture is continuously re-affirmed and/or redefined. 
The broad definition of culture tends to dominate current debates, particularly where the concept is linked 
with democratization processes. The result is that culture and cultural diversity have become vague terms, to be 
interpreted within specific contexts in order to make them useful. This need and potential for re-interpretation 
make the concepts vulnerable to misuse within conflict situations. Leaders interpret the concepts through their 
own specific historical and political perspective on relationship between competing groups. 
One typical use of culture in mobilization of support is in its combination with the concept of human 
“identity”. Cultural identity then defines people’s cultural bonding, the group to which they belong. Within 
mobilization tactics, cultural identity is usually portrayed as a fixed characteristic, which must be defended 
against “others” who are generally viewed as competing for the same resources, power or status (Kaufman, 
2006). 
National governments tend to emphasize national identity to increase social cohesion, national 
consciousness and nation building. The challenge then is to make diverse cultural identities an integral part of 
the national one. This is particularly important in a country like Nigeria which has about 370 different ethnic 
groups (Alubo, 2006). Cultural identity implies freedom of association with groups, communities and ideologies 
which can go beyond national boundaries. People can and do have multiple identities that are complementary, 
e.g. ethnic, social, gender, religious, work. Research has highlighted that cultural identity and national identity 
can coexist. In fact, success stories of peaceful societies world-wide highlight the positive results of this 
coexistence. Acceptance of cultural identity within national identity prevents stifling of social relationships and 
promotes dynamic interactions, creativity, critical thinking and acceptance of history as a shared legacy and the 
future as shared aspirations (Edewor, 1993; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002). Suppression of cultural identity by 
national governments or inequity in recognition can lead to resistance, conflict and civil war. Recognition of 
cultural identities through proportional representation in institutional arrangements easily entrenches cultural 
identities and does not motivate for national integration. This may increase tensions, rather than resolve them 
(Kotze, 2002). 
This brings us to the issue of federalism. As we understand it, this is a form of government in which the 
component units of a political organization participate in sharing powers and functions in a cooperative manner 
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though the combined forces of ethnic pluralism and cultural diversity, amongst others, tend to pull their people 
apart. Delicate arrangements of this kind, where carefully worked out, provide sufficient room for the co-
existence of centre-seeking and centre-fleeing forces. Peace, for lucky communities which achieve and sustain 
measures of this under these arrangements, is not necessarily that of the grave. Where people agree sometimes, 
and disagree at other times, concerning the goals and means of cooperative governments of this kind, friction and 
conflicts do occur (Tamuno, 1998). Where also their systems work, as planned, conflict resolution is quite 
possible: through the timely and effective intervention of accredited authorities and organs of government. 
As interpreted and applied by a succession of military rulers at the federal and state levels in Nigeria, 
federalism engendered fears of over robust centralism. In turn, advocates of confederal alternatives had a field 
day in Nigeria when conflicts could not be resolved with the consent of the governed (Tamuno, 1998). Nigeria’s 
past experience of coup d’etat and counter-coups, since January 1966, indicated that these, like the proverbial 
bad penny, always turned up. Developments such as these helped to give Nigeria’s succession of federal 
arrangements an unstable base during the first four decades of independence and to date. Suberu (2001) rightly 
criticizes federalism as highly distorted and overly centralized. The proposed structures and reforms have existed 
only on paper and have increased the centralization of resources while widening gulfs among different groups. 
Various military and civilian central governments have sought to manipulate the federal system for their own 
gains, not for national developments or the easing of ethnic, religious, or regional tensions. 
Lastly, is national integration. This concept describes a situation in which citizens of a country increasingly 
see themselves as one people, bound by shared historical experiences and common values, and imbued by the 
spirit of patriotism and unity, which transcends traditional, primordial diverse tendencies (Jega, 2002). In post-
colonial societies, such as Nigeria, in particular, it embodies a strategy of forging unity in diversity, and connotes 
a striving to be a unified people in a modern, colonially created, nation-state. National integration has become a 
major post-independence project, which was perceived to be necessary and critical to national progress and 
development. It sought to create patriotic citizens out of disparate, often antagonistic groups. 
Indeed, while at the level of rhetoric, national leaders espoused beliefs in, and commitments to, national 
integration, at the level of real politics, they simultaneously pursued ethno-religious, regional and other divisive 
agendas, whipping primordial sentiments and generating conflicts, which further disunite rather than integrate 
the people. This tendency reached its peak under prolonged military rule. Clearly, there is a connection and 
relationship between the failure of purported efforts at national integration, as evidenced by increased violent 
political and communal conflicts, and socio-economic instability, which in no small measure, is a constraint to 
progress and development. In fact, in a sense, the democratization process of the last couple of years has been 
exploited to pursue division and potentially disintegrating agendas by reckless members of the political class. 
Ethno-religious jingoists and warlords have used the relatively expanded political spaces created by 
democratization to push extremist notions of self-determination, resource control and political restructuring.  
 
3. Historical Background to Ethnic and Cultural Conflicts in Nigeria 
Ethnic and cultural conflicts in Nigeria are rooted in the 1914 merger of the Northern and Southern Protectorates 
by the colonial administration of Lord Frederick Lugard. The amalgamation brought about the involuntary 
unification of culturally and historically diverse ethnic groups, some of which had been rivals and overlapping 
imperialists in the pre-colonial times (Ajayi and Alagoa, 1980). For instance, Benin, at the height of its power 
from the 15
th
 century, had established imperial control over some states in the fringes of present-day Northern 
Nigeria, including Igala and Nupe-speaking areas, which, by virtue of their vassalage were compelled to pay 
tolls and tributes as vassals to the Benin monarch. Benin had also extended control to the South and enjoyed 
suzerainty over several Yoruba states, including Eko (now Lagos), Ondo, Ekiti. This overbearing influence of 
Benin over the Yoruba states had pitted Benin against the declining Oyo Empire before British colonization 
(Ajayi and Akintoye, 1980).  
Similarly, Oyo Empire, prior to its decline and fall, had wielded considerable amount of influence in the 
entire Western part of Nigeria and had also upturned the Benin hegemony to gain control of significant Benin 
provinces and former vassal states. Oyo’s influence also resonated in Ilorin, Ebiraland, Igalaland and Nupeland 
(Ikime, 1985). Thus, the relationship between the Yoruba and Edo-speaking people before colonialism had been 
that of the proverbial cat and mouse, which had led to cold war, mutual distrust and mounting tension. In the 
North, the fourteen Hausa states (Hausa Bekwai and Hausa Banza) were embroiled in a prolonged and chaotic 
relationship of overlapping imperialism. Even the seven legitimate states (Bekwai) had no love lost between 
them, let alone cultural or political synergy between the Bekwai and the illegitimate states (Banza). Kano rose to 
power at the expense of Gobir’s decline, while Kororofa and Kebbi besieged Kano and Rano to rise to power 
and fame and it is on record that it was during the imperial reign of Kebbi under Kotal Kanta that the Hausa 
states reached their height of disunity (Balogun, 1980). It however took the intervention several decades later of 
the Islamic jihadists led by Othman dan Fodio to forcefully unify the Hausa-speaking states under the Islamic 
religion (Balogun, 1980: 217). 
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In the South-South, as culturally homogenous as they seemed, they were far from united. The Efik and 
Ibibio were constantly at loggerheads, while the Urhobo and Itsekiri had ceaseless confrontations. The 
divisiveness and fissiparous tendencies among the ethnic nationalities in this region were capitalized upon by the 
Europeans to “divide and rule” and in the process establishing their hegemony and colonization. 
The 1914 amalgamation was therefore a marriage of convenience (Osaghae, 1991); that is, it was to suit the 
sole purpose of ease of administration and exploitation of the colonial powers. The union of the over 250 ethnic 
nationalities was therefore “unity by a rope of sand” (Folarin, 2012a; 2012b). Nigeria was not meant to work 
because it was not unification by natural evolution. The “Nigeria” project was a distant comparison to Italy, 
Germany and Spain whose unification from the Middle Ages to the 19
th
 century was by the freewill or choice of 
the people under dynamic leadership. The act of merger by the European colonial powers merely forced the 
diverse ethnic groups of Northern and Southern Protectorates into a single entity without consultation with the 
various ethnic groups or their leaders. This autocratic and undemocratic British colonial policy, therefore, 
marked the origin of ethnic conflicts in the country. 
It is pertinent to note that the primordial ethnic underpinnings in the creation of the Nigerian State began to 
resonate before independence. For instance, in 1953 when the nationalists representing Nigeria were offered the 
platform to come to terms with an agreed date of independence, ethnic sentiments and insecurity came to the fore 
as the Northern (Hausa-Fulani) delegates at the constitutional conference objected to a 1956 date proposed by 
the Southern delegates, among whom was late Chief Anthony Enahoro who moved the motion (Ikime, 1985:15). 
The Hausa-Fulani leaders had made it clear by their stout objection that they were not ready for independence as 
the fear of Southern dominance in a post-colonial Nigeria was rife. 
Similarly, as the country prepared for independence, political parties emerged from erstwhile vociferous and 
respected political movements and organizations, which were basically ethnic unions. The Northern People’s 
Congress (NPC) as the name suggests was a cultural movement for Northern peoples’ development. The Action 
Group (AG) was a modified version of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, a pan-Yoruba socio-cultural group; while 
National Congress of Nigeria and the Cameroons metamorphosed into the National Council of Nigerian Citizens 
(NCNC), a Southeastern group led by Igbo ethnic unionists. Other clear ethnic unions that changed to “national” 
parties included the Northern Elements People’s Union (NEPU) and the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), 
which struggled for the control of the centre (Taiwo, 2000). 
Interestingly, however, these regional cum ethnic parties had internal infractions. The UMBC, for instance, 
grew unpopular because of the disagreements among the Nupe, Igala, Idoma, Birom, Angas, Jukum, and the 
others, whose interests the party claimed to represent. This was so because these were the same ethnic groups 
that constantly engaged one another in warfare in the pre-colonial times in search of conquests and glory. The 
NCNC too had issues - the Igbo were distrusted by the South-South groups and would prefer to be politically 
insulated from the former (Ikime, 1985:22). Incidentally, one of the tribal parties, the NPC won the elections and 
constituted the national government in 1960, thus crystallizing an ethnic-based leadership. 
The events of 1960 to 1966 were a critical test of an evolving nationhood. The NPC and NCNC 
subsequently formed a coalition government, which technically meant that the Hausa-Fulani and Igbo had 
reached an understanding while the Yoruba (AG) had been pushed to the political margins as Opposition. The 
power equation between the ethnic nationalities had left the ethnic minorities in the cold, but the understanding 
between the Igbo and Hausa-Fulani soon broke down with the military coup of January 15, 1966. The coup, 
because of the Hausa-Fulani elements that were the most casualties, was perceived as ethnic motivated 
(Ademoyega, 1981). The catalogue of events that followed, including a Northern Nigeria-led countercoup, ethnic 
cleansing in military barracks and the North in which Igbo elements were the victims, and the 30-month Civil 
War, demonstrated an outburst of the deep-seated ethnic resentment and hate that had etched into the polity 
before and shortly after independence.  
After the Civil War, rather than abate, ethnic equation became the underlying factor in much of national life 
in the Nigerian State. These included appointment and promotion in the armed forces, employment in the civil 
and public services, political appointment into public office, admission into institutions of learning, revenue 
allocation, infrastructural development and formation of political parties as well as coup plots (Omoruyi, 2008). 
The federal character principle and quota system, initiated in 1976 and institutionalized by the Babangida 
administration in the mid-1980s became schemes to ensure ethnic balancing in public life. The level of 
separatism and volatility of ethnicity also led to the conception and establishment of the National Youth Service 
Corps (NYSC) in 1973 (Taiwo, 2000:87).  
It is interesting to note that in spite of the plethora of ethnic crisis from 1966 to date, the basic underlying 
factor in election, allocation of resources, party formation and political appointment is ethnic consideration. The 
concepts and propositions such as geopolitical zones, zoning and rotational presidency seem to be more modest 
ways of perpetrating ethnic politics. An uglier dimension of ethnic crisis is intra-ethnic and intra-regional 
disagreements which have led to fratricidal wars and conflicts such as the Tiv-Jukun, Tiv-Hausa, Andoni-Ogoni, 
Umeleri-Aguleri, Ife-Modakeke, and Birom-Fulani conflicts (Folarin, 2011). One basic factor that is 
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comprehensible about these developments is that ethnic conflict has gained momentum because the polity from 
the top-down is structured along ethnic lines and conditioned by a primitive tribal and primordial culture.   
 
4. Managing Ethnic and Cultural Diversity for National Integration 
The following three assertions can be made about Nigeria: First, there is significant inequality within regions as 
well as nationally. Second, state policies are likely to be highly regressive, with an extraordinary share of state 
expenditures captured by national and regional elites. And, third, ordinary as well as elite Nigerians tend to view 
their society in ethnic or religious terms. Therefore, the questions for us here are: (i) to what extent are the ethnic 
(or religious) patterns in Nigerian politics the product of a primordial cultural diversity? (ii) To what extent are 
they the product of a struggle for spoils in a specific institutional context? (iii) To what extent are they the cause 
and the consequence of political conflict? (iv) What constitutionally backed institutions can be developed to 
manage these ethnic/cultural diversity and conflicts? (v) How do we achieve national integration in Nigeria? 
Years before the attainment of independence, Nigeria’s constitutional development experiences were 
concerned with the principal goal of managing ethnicity which had shown clear signs of subverting the nation-
building project. Federalism, the creation of regions and states and local governments, the shift from 
parliamentarism to presidentialism, the institutionalization of quota systems, the prohibition of ethnic political 
parties, consociational politicking, and the adoption of the federal character principle are some of the approaches 
that Nigeria has taken to manage ethnic diversity (Ukiwo, 2005). These mechanisms have enjoyed the 
intellectual backing of institutionalists who posit that there is a connection between ethnic conflict or peace and 
the nature of political institutions (Horowitz, 1985). Several works on ethnicity in Nigeria have been committed 
to examining the impact of these approaches to the management of ethnicity (Ekeh and Osaghae, 1989; 
Adamolekun, 1991; Ekekwe, 1986; Horowitz, 1985; Mustapha, 1986; Nnoli, 1995; Osaghae, 1998; Suberu, 2001, 
Edewor,& Aluko, 2007). 
The verdict of such scholars who have examined the issues from different theoretical standpoints is that 
while these initiatives have solved some old problems, they have generated many unintended consequences that 
have exacerbated ethnicity. What is more, they have been destabilizing for the Nigerian state system. As Suberu 
(2001) has noted with respect to revenue allocation and states creation: 
 
The establishment of nine separate commissions on revenue allocation since 1946 has led to 
neither development of an acceptable or stable sharing formula nor the elaboration of an 
appropriate framework of values and rules within which a formula can be devised and 
incrementally adjusted to cope with changing circumstances (p.11). 
 
Given the share multiplicity of fluidity of the territorial and cultural cleavages that can be used 
to justify the demands for new states and the federal resources they bring with them, there is 
no certainty that the states-creation process will ever be concluded in Nigeria (p.15). 
 
Analysts have attributed the limitations of the ethnic management policies to improper implementation, 
distortion of visions and lack of political will. Some, however, doubt the possibility of a state that generates 
fissiparous tendencies (Ibrahim, 2000) and a predatory class that is endlessly looking for formulas to divide the 
Nigerian peoples (Mustapha, 1986) implementing policies that promote ethnic peace and harmony. Also, the 
viability of these new states created is unclear, with the exception of the oil-producing states in the south. Some 
of these states have recently become conduits for the personal enrichment of the elites at the expense of 
alleviating poverty and creating job opportunities for the rest of the population. 
There have been reports of disparities in the distribution of oil resources in Nigeria for many years. This 
contentious issue has fuelled most of the recent ethnic conflicts in the country. Some ethnic groups, especially 
those in the oil producing areas argue that they are not receiving enough funds for their own development (Irobi, 
2005). These are the dynamics behind the Ogoni crisis and the recent sporadic ethnic violence in the oil 
producing Niger Delta states. We would argue that unless this issue is resolved, the economic base of the country 
will be jeopardized. The undemocratic 1999 federal constitution lacks the support of the citizens. The 
constitution was drafted by military dictators and handed over to the people. It has not gone far enough to 
resolve the problems of ethnicity that the country has faced since independence. 
National integration in the Nigerian context has been an attempt to forge “unity in diversity” and aggressive 
attempts to ignore, if not dissolve, historic differences. Successive military rules sought to wish away socio-
cultural differences and impose uniformity in spite of complex cultural diversity. Unfortunately, the more such 
projects were pursued, the more acute the contradictions become, the more conflicts erupted; and the more 
problems were created, which posed obstacles to unity, peaceful coexistence, progress and stable development. 
National integration in a multi-cultural state like Nigeria is unattainable without an entrenched public culture 
because this comprises the values shared by all groups and constitutes the common grounds on which the diverse 
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groups conceptualize and appreciate the state. In Nigeria, groups strive to impose their particularistic definition 
of public culture on the entire polity. The area of society-wide agreement which constitutes public culture is still 
too narrow (Ikpe, 1991). People, therefore, struggle to overthrow existing public culture rather than identify with 
it due to its parochiality. National integration and its attached benefits, like democracy and political stability can 
be realized only with the development and entrenchment of a supportive public culture. 
What is to be done? Perhaps, the best way to begin to address these threats to “national integration” is to 
recognize that unity does not mean uniformity, and that understanding, respecting and tolerating differences 
occasioned by socio-cultural diversity, is by far better than strenuously striving to wish them away. A complex, 
plural colonially created “nation state” such as Nigeria can only survive and flourish in the 21
st
 century on the 
basis of tolerance and accommodation of socio-cultural differences, rather than on a narrow-minded pursuit of an 
exclusivist and parochial self-interest (Jega, 2002). Also, since the rules for sharing federal revenues clearly 
provide incentives for regionalist politics, Suberu (2001) recommends a further decentralization of funds through 
further revision of vertical division of revenues, together with a revised horizontal division with increased 
rewards for local revenue generation. In general, however, federalism is a bad way of getting public resources to 
the poor, and it is unclear how far reforms can overcome this.  
 
5. Conclusion 
It can be seen that ethnic conflict arise as a result of the denial of the basic needs of access, identity, autonomy, 
security and equality, compounded by the autocratic roles played by the government and the military. Also, the 
violent conflicts in Lagos, Kano, and the Niger Delta resulted in a more distorted pattern of governance, which 
led to further denial of basic needs to the masses. Conflict management is more effective if government is devoid 
of corruption. In tune with John Burton’s theory (Burton, 1997), this is the only way to satisfy people’s basic 
needs. 
In addition, the role of good political leadership cannot be overemphasized. Nigeria has been less fortunate 
in its leadership. Ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria have continued because Nigerian elites are corrupt and split 
along lines of religion and ethnicity. This has resulted in ethnic rivalry, suspicion and hostility among leaders. 
Without a bold and articulate leadership, conflict management, prevention and national integration, will always 
be a mirage.  
Also, there is the need to transform ethnic politics into mutually beneficial relationships. To do this, Nigeria 
must withdraw from its old and ineffective approaches and develop new institutions and mechanisms that can 
address poverty, revenue allocation, and other national issues peacefully. Strategies of discrimination and 
ethnicity are not in the interest of peace and democracy. The provision of the people’s basic human needs is a 
major strategy that would lead to lasting peace and harmonious living. 
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